Big serge substack

It is probably safe to say that the current week Juneis shaping up to be one of the most significant of the entire Russo-Ukrainian War. On Monday, all eyes were big serge substack the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their much anticipated summer counteroffensive, which began with a series of battallion level attacks across the breadth of the theater.

As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence. The nature of the war changed dramatically after a kinetic and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not , it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thanks to a pipeline of western support in the form of material, financial aid, and ISR and targeting assistance which allowed Ukraine to transcend its rapidly evaporating indigenous war economy, it became clear that this would be a war of industrial attrition, rather than rapid maneuver and annihilation. Russia began to mobilize resources for this sort of attritional war in the Autumn of , and since then the war has attained its present quality - that of a firepower intensive but relatively static positional struggle. The nature of this attritional-positional war lends itself to analytic ambiguity, because it denies the most attractive and obvious signs of victory and defeat in large territorial changes. Instead, a whole host of anecdotal, small scale positional analysis, and foggy data has to suffice, and this can be easily misconstrued or misunderstood.

Big serge substack

In the last 72 hours or so, the pro-Russian side of the internet has been sent into an tailspin of panic over a new Ukrainian counteroffensive which is currently being launched in the Kharkov region, with the intention of compromising the Russian army grouping at Izyum. The panic was triggered by claims that Ukraine was advancing unopposed, encircling - or perhaps even capturing - the city of Balakliya - and on the verge of cutting off supply lines to Izyum. A modest city with a prewar population of perhaps 50, people, Izyum was always slated to be a focal point in this war, due to its location at a critical intersection. The topography of northeastern Ukraine is dominated by a few critically important features which determine patterns of movement. The region is furthermore shaped by the Severodonetsk River - alternatively called simply the Donets from which the Donbas, or Donets Basin, draws its name - which snakes lazily around the plain. Izyum is a strategically crucial city because it is where the highway crosses the river; as an added cherry on top, the Oskil River - a major tributary of the Donets - confluences with the Donets less than five miles to the east of Izyum, meaning the city essentially sits directly on the intersection of all the most important geographic features of the region. A highly simplified map of the area looks like this:. Capturing Izyum was a major objective for Russia in the early weeks of the war as I argued in a previous piece , this was a major reason for the pinning move on Kiev , because it not only interdicts and complicates supply to Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, but it also gave Russia an early position on the Donets river. It is obvious why Ukraine would want to dislodge Russia from Izyum. To achieve this, they are attempting a thrust toward Kupyansk, with the aim of cutting the line connecting Izyum to Belgorod in the north. This operation, I believe, is doomed to spectacular failure.

It's a good thing President Putin is calm and not senile like Biden or temperamental like the American president's entourage, big serge substack. In the near term meaning the spring and summer months we big serge substack expect Russia to progress towards the following intermediate operational goals:. As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence.

Military history writer Big Serge has published an excellent essay that explains much of what has puzzled observers of the conflict in Ukraine—why does Russia appear to be hanging back, what happened to that much touted offensive, and some other matters as well. First, however, here are some basic points that will serve as guide posts. Russia, for political reasons, has not yet declared war on Ukraine—the conflict remains, legally, a Special Military Operation. Legality is very important to him, as we know from his criticisms of the Rules-Based Order, in which the rules are unilaterally made up on the go. A declaration of war may or may not happen, but the lack of such a declaration at this point places constraints on the Russian military.

The Phalanx CIWS SEE-wiz is an automated gun-based close-in weapon system to defend military watercraft automatically against incoming threats such as aircraft, missiles, and small boats. This is essentially the ships last layer of defense against any incoming attacks. A smart commenter asks the right question, which leads to this exchange:. What I don't get is why aren't the Houthis shooting salvos? Single missiles have very little chances of success. Just a matter of time before we lose a ship. This is more like pot shots.

Big serge substack

Military history writer Big Serge has published an excellent essay that explains much of what has puzzled observers of the conflict in Ukraine—why does Russia appear to be hanging back, what happened to that much touted offensive, and some other matters as well. First, however, here are some basic points that will serve as guide posts. Russia, for political reasons, has not yet declared war on Ukraine—the conflict remains, legally, a Special Military Operation. Legality is very important to him, as we know from his criticisms of the Rules-Based Order, in which the rules are unilaterally made up on the go. A declaration of war may or may not happen, but the lack of such a declaration at this point places constraints on the Russian military. The Russian military is composed of a professional military—personnel who are on contract—and conscripts. Conscripts serve only for a limited time and are mostly trainees for most of their service. Importantly, they cannot be used outside the Russian Federation unless there has been a declaration of war. This lack of full complements is being solved through the mobilization, but the problem of integrating the call-ups into the new organizational structure remains a work in progress.

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Flooding disproportionately affected the Russian side of the river and destroyed Russian positions. Thats my trolling alter ego, cruelly suppressed by dk flag policy. Substack is the home for great writing. That would give Ukraine a budget of about 3, shells per day - enough to sustain moderate intensity, but far below what they need. The region is furthermore shaped by the Severodonetsk River - alternatively called simply the Donets from which the Donbas, or Donets Basin, draws its name - which snakes lazily around the plain. It has rebuilt cities and developed farming. There was even a rumor that Zaluzhny told Zelensky that the counteroffensive had failed already in the opening weeks of the operation. Then some clamor, and some American snaps his fingers, european knees hit the floor with a resounding thwack! Earlier this year, they were actually keeping the Kakhovka resevoir levels extremely low , most likely to minimize the threat of Ukraine breaching the dam as Surovikin was apparently quite worried about. In the center of the front, Russian advances on the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar axes converge on the critical Ukrainian hub of Konstyantinivka, the capture of which is one of the absolute prerequisites for any serious attempt to move on the Kramatorsk agglomeration. I hope Russia tears Ukraine apart, shred it to pieces and bring this war to an end This is a severe humanitarian and ecological disaster with implications for the military situation in Ukraine. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that small drones can be manufactured in distributed facilities and do not require the capital intensive production centers vulnerable to Russian strike systems that artillery shells do. Please Remain Calm.

With the Russo-Ukrainian War now rolling on into its seventh month, I thought this might be as good a time as any to put together a more extensive analysis than the twitter format allows. What follows will be my assessment of what exactly the Russian Armed Forces have achieved, why they made specific operational choices, and the general shape of the battlefield today. But first, I will indulge in a brief paragraph about myself.

Russia has been working for years to build the Crimea. Drones are also subject to disruptions from weather and electronic warfare in ways that artillery is not. Ultimately, perhaps your judgement on the matter simply reflects your larger belief about who is winning the war. At the estimated long-run availability of 3, per day, Ukraine can have some basic functionality, but they will find it difficult to accumulate a stockpile to allow higher intensity offensive operations. This site requires JavaScript to run correctly. Both Nordstream and the Kakhovka dam were tools that Russia had the power to swing in one direction or the other. I love it. Big Serge Surges Ukraine. Obviously that large number is unrealistic, but a recent study from the Estonian Ministry of Defense estimated that at minimum Ukraine will need , shells per month Roughly 6, per day. The enemy is transferring a bunch of reserves by air. It's a good thing President Putin is calm and not senile like Biden or temperamental like the American president's entourage. This site requires JavaScript to run correctly. See, e.